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Summary
ATOS is an experimental project based on 3 simple guiding principles aimed at integrating several disciplines for a risk
analysis. The three guiding principles are:
- a vision of the organisation with a balance between an formal (centralised, or what is written) and an informal
(decentralised, or unwritten rules) part,
- "you do not manage what you cannot measure",
- a focus on the quality of the barriers for the risk control.
The disciplines involved in this project are, respectively to these principles, the organisational sociology, quality
management and engineering. In this paper, the approach is explained and the result of a first application is presented.
ATOS is designed to be a transferable tool for managers who have in charge the management of major hazard
prevention.
Introduction
The ATOS project, Analysis of Technical and
Organisational Safety, has been developed following
the European Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9
December 1996 on the control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances. Indeed, the
directive contains a specific requirement in its annexe 3
for the risk control through the implementation of a
safety management system (SMS). This SMS
spécification has been included in accordance with the
high rates of organisational root causes admitted to be
at the origins of the accidents [1].
This new requirement of the directive introduces a
dynamic dimension of prevention. The risk analysis is
therefore not anymore a static approach (like a
photograph) of the installation that includes only the
safety design of it, but includes also now the interaction
with its environment. The people and groups of people
working on it constitute its direct environment, within the
limits of the plants.
Thus, the new SMS requirement raises directly the
question about the impact of this environment on the
technical system. These people and group of people,
within the limits of the plants, are ruled in their activities
by management systems (like does a SMS) but as well
as by the interactions they have each other.
This complex environment within the boundary of the
plant needs to be addressed and introduced in the risk
analysis.
This document describes an attempt to create a method
integrating this dynamic dimension between technical
and organisational issues. One question raised is
therefore how can the link between the technical and
the organisational approach be made explicit.
2 ATOS objectives and associated
concepts
The project ATOS has several objectives:
2.1 Creating a frame where people from
different disciplines could integrate
their knowledge.
An objective of ATOS is to allow people with different
background to work together. It means that these
people must share a common understanding of the risk
analysis and risk control; and the role they play in that
analysis. This requirement can be met through a
common vocabulary and concepts associated with it,
and with a model of the approach that can bring a
shared vision of the project. These steps are the
elementary phases of the process of disciplines
integration for a common objective.
The common objective here is indeed to include a
dynamic dimension to the risk analysis. For that, three
competencies are integrated in ATOS:
- Engineering, for the technical risk analysis of the
installation (engineering science),
- quality auditing for the SMS structure (management
science),
- organisational sociology for the study of interactions
between people within a defined system (social
science).
ATOS is really an experimental project because the
dimensions, the concepts, the ideas that each discipline
brings in the project do not match immediately. A lot of
working-group work has to be done to start to apply
specific tools from the different approaches in a
common frame, where they can all "fit". This is what we
could call a process of integration of disciplines (figure
1).
2.2 Integrating a human approach in the
SMS through the organisational
sociology angle.
The ATOS concept is based on the SMS specifications
described in the annexe 3 of the SEVESO II [2]. This is
therefore the starting point of the approach.
A SMS is seen as a structure of the organisation that
rules the work processes of different levels of people
working in chemical plants for the major hazard
prevention; from the director, to the manager to the
operator. The SMS is traceable, in the sense where an
auditor can check the activities through formal
documents (formal is defined as something written).
This traceability is the support of the principle of
assurance.
Assurance implies that you can proof through tangible
traces that things are carried out against defined rules.
It can be therefore a procedure, a record of an action
performed against a procedure, a work maintenance
planning etc...The directive gives 7 main chapters that
must be implemented through these principles of
assurance and traceability.
It is argued that this approach has its limits. A
description of two obvious limits is presented here.
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Figure 1 : Process of integration from pluri to interdisciplinary approach
2.2.1 Everything can't be written
First of all, everything (in relation with the risk control)
can't be written. All situations can't be foreseen and
described in procedures.
That point has been identified as an important feature in
organisational approaches in general. Centralisation
(everything has to be written) versus decentralisation
(everything has not to be written) is a core concept
which has been widely issued. James Reason [3]
identified two types of organisations:
"Administrative controls range from the mainly
prescriptive to the largely discretionary. The former
depend primarily upon external procedures, while the
latter are provided by internalised knowledge and
experience-orin a word, training. Between the two are
various blends and mixtures. "
Here the terms prescriptive - discretionary are used.
James Reason imagined a continuum on which
organisations would move along, depending on their
style, more prescriptive, or more discretionary. This is
an interesting concept.
C.Perrow in his "Normal Accident" book [4] wrote about
this idea of the organisation position between
centralised (prescriptive) and decentralised
(discretionary) style, when participating in some
discussions about nuclear power plants organisation:
"we cycled endlessly through the problem of insuring
rapid, unquestioning response to orders from high (or
orders in the procedures manual), and at the same time
allowing discretion to operators. Regarding discretion,
the operators would have the latitude to make unique
diagnoses of the problem and disregarded the manual,
and be free of orders from remote authorities who did
not have hands-on daily experience with the system.
We could recognise the need for both, we could not find
a way to have both"
This is an issue that needs to be explicitly questioned.
What sort of organisation could comply with both
needs? How to measure that position along the
Reason's imaginary continuum. Centralisation
(everything under formal activities) is necessary but not
sufficient, because of the unpredictable. The
unpredictable implies decentralisation to cope
accordingly and independently in real time with a
situation of potential disaster, individually but also within
a group. How to describe this balance is a key issue
(figure 2).
During the daily life of an organisation, they are things
done in relation with the prevention of major hazard
which are not formal. These things are an
organisational answer to unpredicted events, in the
sense where they are not and won't be covered by any
procedures. These situations arise under constraints
and changes of the technical environment (the
installation and technical system itself that designers
can't totally cover) but as well as changes and
constraints of the organisation itself (people
interactions, changes in the organisation structure
etc...). That will always be the case, there will be
always unpredicted situations.
So rather than expecting of a system to write
everything, it is important to consider right from the start
that everything won't be written. That is important to
integrate the aspects in the SMS assessment
approach.
2.2.2 Everything can't be tangible through
paper traceability
The SMS features covers 7 areas of management,
most of them directly safety related:
Identification and evaluation of major hazards.
Management of change.
Operational control.
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2. Between the formal and
the informal
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-good traceability
Figure 2. Balance between formal and informal aspects of organisations
Emergency preparedness.
Learning from experience.
The 2 others are general requirements of management
systems in general (quality, environment etc...):
Organisation and personnel.
Audit and review.
These chapters cover a range of organisational
features that however do not give a complete picture of
what is the organisation. As written previously, again,
one need to go beyond what is written.
These chapters and their implementations becomes
formal and therefore tangible aspect of the
organisation, related to safety. They are "written rules"
that shape the structure of the organisation. It is not a
discovery for anybody to say that some "unwritten
rules" do exist too [5]. They are actually never explicitly
mentioned in any management system because they
are the result of interactions between people [6], [7].
These unwritten rules are developing as a result of
interaction between people at several levels of the
organisation.
These unwritten rules have an impact on features of the
organisation like communication, co-ordination,
leadership, decision making, learning... These
organisational features are not explicitly formulated in
the SMS but they are acknowledged to be important
characteristics of an effective organisation, according to
a sociological perspective.
It is actually understandable that no formal traces exist
of these features. How could you rely on paper to say
that you have a good leadership in the company? How
could rely on paper to assure that you have an
appropriate co-operation?
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Figure 3: 2 complementary approaches of the organisatior
It is suggested in ATOS that the two approaches will be
used for the risk analysis. The problem of their interface
is therefore clearly raised.
2.3 Creating a set of safety indicators
based on this specific approach.
2.2.3 Consequence for the ATOS concept.
As a consequence, the concept acknowledges two
dimensions of the organisation. There is a formal side
described as a written part of the organisation, covered
by a management system, and there is an informal
described as the not written part of the company.
It is argued in ATOS that both an auditing technique1
(assessment of the formal side of the organisation in
relation to the major hazard prevention) and a
sociological approach of the organisation (assessment
of informal features of the organisation) must be
complementary. This sociological approach is based on
the strategic analysis2. Together, these two approaches
must give a more comprehensive picture of the
organisation (figure 3).
The technique of auditing consists of checking compliance against
formal standards and records, through the auditing loop including for
steps: asking, looking, checking and recording.
2
 The stategic analysis [6] is aimed at understanding the unwritten
rules, the underlying structure of an organisation, using a system
approach based on the power, bounded rationality and culture to
define the relationships between the actors of the organisation. This
allows to give a more dynamic picture of the organisation and is a
good tool for driving the change if necessary.
2.3.1 The SMS performance measurement
system
A SMS is based on the principle that "you do not
manage what you cannot measure". For that a
performance measurement system is built within the
SMS. This system is based on indicators.
These indicators give a picture of the state of the SMS.
The indicators must be therefore closely related to the
prevention of the major hazard. Two alternatives are
possible at this stage: trying to eliminate all initiating
events and therefore put some indicators on these
practices or trying to assess the defences that prevent
the risk [2], [8].
The later proposition is more relevant since the
complexity of the systems (a chemical plants) make the
search for the initiating event a rather difficult task [4].
It is suggested in ATOS that the performance
measurement system must show how the risk control is
assured bya high quality of the barriers, or in other
words, in accordance to the quality approach, by the
assurance of the barriers effectiveness.
Basically, these line of defences can be described as
technical equipment (a pressure valve system) or as a
human operation (an operator who must shut down the
installation under defined criteria).
The seven chapters of the annexe 3 of the SEVESO II
directive describing the SMS are the organisational
mechanisms that give support to the quality of the
barrier. For example, the management of change is
implemented in order to assure that any technical
modifications on the installation will be assessed in
terms of its impact on the safety on the installation, and
therefore on its impact on the effectiveness of the
barriers. The organisation and personnel chapter will
assure that the people (at any levels) will receive the
appropriate training terms of safety issues related to
their work...etc...
So in terms of indicators there are outcome indicators
which describe the level of assurance of the barriers
and the activities indicators which describes how the
organisational mechanisms are working and
implemented. Both can be checked through the auditing
technique (see figure 4).
It is the easiest way to create tangible indicators that
anybody can ask for to check the compliance
(subjectivity is eliminated- it is here or it is nor here).
Does the record of the last preventive maintenance on
this equipment according to the maintenance plan
exist? Yes or No? This is a good example of tangible
indicator (that can be even use for quantification).
Sometimes however a judgement is required too. For
example, there is an emergency procedure for an
unusual situation at work during the process. How do
you know if that emergency procedure is relevant for
other unusual situation that may arise (see 2.2.1
everything can't be written)? These more intangible
indicators of compliance need to be clearly address
when it comes to audit a system at the operational
level. Often the solution is to rank the judgement on a
semi-quantitative scale from bad to good.
2.3.2 Adding the informal part in the
performance measurement system
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Figure 4. Representation of a safety performance measurement system SMPS
The auditing technique is based on the traceability,
every questions related to the system must found its
justification on paper.
FORMAL INFORMAL
This measurement performance system is therefore
based on a formal aspect of the organisation. What is
suggested here is to add the informal features
described earlier (see 2.2.2 everything can't be tangible
through paper traceability), through the same indicators
classification between tangible and intangible. This
work would be done through a different approach of the
organisation than the auditing one, a sociological
approach. This sociological approach will be based on
the strategic analysis [6], [7].
This figure (figure 5) includes the informal aspect of the
organisation in the safety performance measurement
system of the SMS described previously:
"written rules" "unwritten rules"
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Figure 5. Adding the informal dimension to the representation of SPMS
Site tests
3.1 Methodology
For the site experimentation, the following steps have
been applied.
First a technical risk analysis that allows to identify the
scenarios and the banners for the risk control. These
barriers are technical equipment as well as human
operations.
Secondly all the formal aspects that could be related
through the assurance of this barriers is checked
through the audit technique with the 7 points of the
SMS.
And finally the sociological approach is carried out.
In certain cases, the company does not have a formal
SMS. In that situation an initial review is carried out to
identify the practices linked to the major hazard
prevention as a starting point, and therefore can
address the formal activities that need to be written.
The sociological assessment evaluates how to
implement as best as possible the formal SMS based
on the initial review, to map the informal features of the
organisation.
These three steps are represented in figure 6.
3.2 First tests
The first application of this method is currently carried
on a SME chemical plant.
4 Conclusion
The ATOS method is an innovative concept trying to
merge different relevant approaches for the risk
assessment. The angles selected for that assessment,
namely engineering, management and sociology, have
been integrated in ATOS. This integrative process led
to the interdisciplinarity, where different specialists can
communicate and build a common frame for the risk
assessment.
The ATOS method consists in three steps: a technical
risk analysis, an audit of a formal SMS and a
sociological approach revealing the informal side of the
organisation.
The application of that method on site showed the
difficulty for one person to encompass the whole
method, and it is definitely a complementary work
between specialists that has to be done for the
moment. The quality of the link between the technical
analysis and the organisation assessment depends on
this.
Finally, to be transferable to managers, the method
must be further described and worked out, particularly
through the development of a set of appropriate
indicators.
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Figure 6. ATOS method
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